{"blyg":"0.4","id":"7as6ww0f6pzsq8jedg0hchndqr","kind":"thread","origin":"https://blyg.florianlohse.com/","page":"t/7as6ww0f6pzsq8jedg0hchndqr/","author":{"name":"Florian Lohse","url":"https://florianlohse.com/"},"created":"2026-10-25T15:09:18Z","updated":"2026-11-03T21:14:53Z","version":4,"content_md":"I started reading [\"The Relentless Revolution\"](https://www.amazon.com/dp/0393339394?lv=shuf&channelId=500&plpRedirect=mhFallback) by Joyce Appleby.  \nWill append reading notes below.\n\n![[1y3t9rdd8kckjgaq9v7d3sxhhy]]\n\n![[6f8wfp78mcnat9yr6fzv1t18q6]]\n\n![[3ryetf2ypk8xj5sf9ag3bhetsa]]","content_html":"<p>I started reading <a href=\"https://www.amazon.com/dp/0393339394?lv=shuf&amp;channelId=500&amp;plpRedirect=mhFallback\">&quot;The Relentless Revolution&quot;</a> by Joyce Appleby.<br>\nWill append reading notes below.</p>\n\n<blockquote class=\"blyg-transclusion\" data-blyg-id=\"1y3t9rdd8kckjgaq9v7d3sxhhy\" data-blyg-version=\"1\">\n<p>Learning about the economic baseline of &quot;on seven fat years will follow seven lean years&quot;: In biblical times, several good harvests in a row caused population to grow so quickly that a period of famine was sure to follow.</p>\n<p>Interestingly this is not at all the implication I remember from the bible reference, where it always seemed to be related to fate. This proved to be wrong, as mankind managed to leave this cycle by its own means, with adaptions like four-field crop rotation, import of high-yield crops and later-marriage traditions.</p>\n<p>The teleological idea of &quot;what goes up, must come down&quot; seems to have survived though, for example in the &quot;good times create weak men&quot;-meme.</p>\n<p>What goes up, must come down (if there are no better ideas).</p>\n\n</blockquote>\n\n<blockquote class=\"blyg-transclusion\" data-blyg-id=\"6f8wfp78mcnat9yr6fzv1t18q6\" data-blyg-version=\"2\">\n<h1>Flavors of Capitalism</h1>\n<p>In &quot;The Relentless Revolution - A History of Capitalism&quot;, Joyce Appleby set out to demonstrate that the thing we call Capitalism today is not a necessity that had to happen, but rather a very specific economic paradigm, shaped by its location of origin (18th century England) and a range of historic coincidences. For Appleby, today’s Capitalism is not &quot;inexorable, inevitable or destined&quot; but a surprising detour from a  relatively stable economic order that reigned for several millennia.<br>\nI like this premise, as it favors <a href=\"https://nilsgilman.substack.com/p/thinking-historically-about-the-future\">contingency over the more often used agency- and structure-focused approaches to history</a>.</p>\n<p>Reading the book I realized I really needed an updated in 18th and 19th century history (in particular in regards to the US). And in relation to Appleby's intention I realized that my understanding of &quot;Capitalism&quot; indeed was a very naturalized one.</p>\n<p>So going back to square one and asking &quot;What is Capitalism?&quot;, this is what I took from Appleby as a universal and culture-neutral definition:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>Capitalism requires <em>capital</em>, which is private Money invested expecting a profit, instead of Money being spend or hoarded</li>\n<li>Capitalism generates <em>profits</em> by transforming production itself, instead of mere trading of goods from a stable production apparatus</li>\n<li>Capital-driven economies are called Capital-<em>ism</em> when investment is the primary society-shaping force</li>\n</ol>\n<p>To arrive at what we have today, there is a whole lot of contingent elements we have to add:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>the teleological claim that all nations were climbing some kind of developmental ladder towards the anglo-saxon machine age ideal</li>\n<li>the idea that markets should be free and self-regulated</li>\n<li>consumer-culture as a key driver of economic growth</li>\n<li>the internalization of capitalist investment logics and personal risk-taking as a mainstream mindset of self-improvement and wanting &quot;more&quot; -&gt; this is where Appleby rejects Adam Smiths framing of these traits as innate human nature</li>\n<li>the organizational concept of big-corporate serving as independent legal entitites with limited liability and a professional managerial class</li>\n<li>the specific cultural biases of the US settler mindset: weak governments, appreciation of homogenized material culture,  cheap labor provided by slaves and immigrants</li>\n<li>burning composted dinosaurs to boost everything even further</li>\n</ul>\n<p>If we zoom in on the words, this is how it could be distinguished:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>capitalism</strong> = the universal, culture-neutral technical definition from above</li>\n<li><strong>Capitalism</strong> = the naturalized brandname of the English/US-flavored capitalism that has dominated the 19th and 20th century</li>\n<li><strong>this-kind-of-capitalism</strong> = a construction that signifies contingency of one historic form of capitalism\nA nice aspect: <em>capitalisms</em> works as plural, but <em>Capitalisms</em> seem impossible (thanks to Claude for this one).</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Now Appleby also contrasts Capitalism™️ against other capitalisms. We may consider this as alternative contingency layers put on top of the capitalist core idea.</p>\n<p>Throughout the book, Germany is frequently used as example for such an alternative flavour, with some essential differences:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>German capitalism relied more on financing by large national banks than on stock markets, with a more patient longterm investment motivation and often shared equity interests</li>\n<li>Early German capitalism relied more on deep research based scientific specialization, enabled by an integrated ecosystem of state-funded university education, laboratories and corporations cooperating. In contrast, US and UK (at least initially) seem to have focused less on deep tech and more on boosting productivity</li>\n<li>German capitalism gave cartels a legal status, serving to stabilize prices in the market by coordination between cartel members. This softened the turmoils of competition, reduced mergers into giant corporations but also reduced innovative impulses</li>\n<li>German welfare laws reduced the pressure for workers to emigrate to the US. This made firing people much harder and created a cushion for workers that were let go</li>\n<li>Germany also developed the GmbH (private limited liability companies) to support a diversity of middle sized businesses and prevent heavy consolidation in single sectors</li>\n<li>post-war Germany developed its own version of Big Corporate, with more comitee- than individual-genius-driven decision making</li>\n</ul>\n<p>This characterisation of German flavoured capitalism fascinates me. Most of these traits are still active today and combined, these shape the way German economy works, showing both its specific strengths and weaknesses. At the one hand, German capitalism has lots of features that soften the worst edges of unregulated competition and capital accumulation. On the other hand, these specifics also create a dampening effect to the upsides of this economic system. The floor and the ceiling are less distant in the German version of capitalism.</p>\n<p>It strikes me that the German specifics of capitalism are much more present in German mainstream discourse than the universal features of vanilla capitalism. While I know about the advantages of all the buffering elements in the German economy, I now see the disadvantages of this specific perspective more clearly. I think the German understanding of Capitalism has largely formed around &quot;taming&quot;, &quot;prevention&quot; and &quot;protection&quot; against an ambigous force that might sweep away everything. I think the intuitive position of the average German would probably considered strongly <em>anti</em>-capitalist by US-american standards. Which is really weird, because the average German is also super conservative and considers a left-wing mayor in Berlin a greater thread to society than having fascists rule an entire state in Eastern Germany.</p>\n<p>To me it seems that an intuitive understanding of the core traits of capitalism (leverage private investment into transforming the modes of production) is only present within a relatively small business- and capital-adjacent elite that is so smug that the last economy-liberal party (FDP) representing this group has now disappeared into oblivion after years of embarrassing themselves with hypocritical takes on meritocracy.</p>\n<p>Reading <em>The Relentless Revolution</em> has changed my understanding of German economy in an interesting way. I now have a greater appreciation for the kinds of grass-roots capitalist economic acumen that I often observed by folks from the UK and US.</p>\n\n</blockquote>\n\n<blockquote class=\"blyg-transclusion\" data-blyg-id=\"3ryetf2ypk8xj5sf9ag3bhetsa\" data-blyg-version=\"2\">\n<h1>Ideas, Matter and the Making of Capitalism</h1>\n<p>In <em>The Relentless Revolution</em> Joyce Appleby refuses to pick a side between ideas and matter. Instead she insists that capitalism &quot;is as much a cultural as an economic system&quot; (ch. 1).  The result is a take on history in which harvests, inventions and shopping carts matter as much as pamphlets, theories and morals.</p>\n<p>This balanced position between materialism and idealism seems refreshing. In my (fairly limited) experience with history writing more often than not there is one side that is favoured over the other as analytical lens. Either you get a materialist deep dive, digging through economic statistics and technical trivia. Or you get an idealist sweep, pulling a philosophical line from ancient greek to the present without ever touching the ground.<br>\nAppleby's refusal to choose is interesting because it lets something else come into view: the <em>interplay</em> between ideas and matter. This allowed me to shift my thinking from timeless ontology (&quot;Is capitalism a material condition or an idea?&quot;) to timed causality (&quot;What comes first, how do Ideas and matter interact, what comes next?&quot;).</p>\n<p>Cross reading the book searching for interplay between material and idealistic movements was an interesting exercise. This of course is my reading, dangerously interpolated from only one source. Appleby's history of capitalism is so rich that it would also allow to draw many more such conclusions. So this is my contingent bit of vibe-theorizing, some patterns of how ideas and matter interacted in shaping capitalism.</p>\n<p>I realized it is more interesting to differentiate &quot;matter&quot; and &quot;ideas&quot; one step further:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Matter-Space</strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Conditions (material potential): soil, steam power, silver, good/bad harvests, coal</li>\n<li>Practice (what people actually do): engineering craft, grain hoarding, lending at interest</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n<li><strong>Idea-Space</strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Mentality (informal habits and mindset): Scarcity fatalism, hidalgo honor, dutch provisioning</li>\n<li>Canon (formalized ideas and ™️-ed Frameworks): laws, doctrines, economic theory, state values\nNow this complication gives us some nice patterns:</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>1) Material conditions only spawn material practice when the idea space is ready for it</strong><br>\nIn chapter 5 Appleby states &quot;Conditions make things possible for causes to work, but they cannot cause anything&quot;. That means material ingredients for great shifts can be in place for years, decades or even centuries. Yet it requires an ideational spark for things to take off. This pattern repeats throughout the book:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>People used steam for cooking since millenias and every single boiling pot demonstrated the forces provided in steam. Yet it took a conceptual framework like Newtonian mechanics to get things moving.</li>\n<li>Premodern trading hubs like Florence, Aleppo and the Canton region had all the wealth and talent to revolutionise their modes of production. But the scarcity mindset and associated traditionalism induced by frequent famines prevented the breakthroughs that happened much later in Northern Europe.</li>\n<li>Early colonialist Spain held a powerful position with New World Silver, booming shipyards and lucrative wool trade. Yet the lack of imagination by the ruling aristocrats towards expanding commerce let all these riches flow out of the country again.</li>\n<li>France fell severely behind in agricultural innovation while the neighbouring dutch, effectively working the same soil as the French, pulled ahead with innovative farming methods. The french system held on to feudalist farm structures, greedy landlords and regional toll systems that delayed the agricultural revolution in France for about a century.</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>2) The canonization of ideas follows material practice</strong><br>\nFor England, Appleby states: &quot;Nobody aimed to change social values. That happened through the process of responding to new experiences&quot; (Ch. 4). While past book club readings already took some deeper dives on investigating how canonical ideas got <em>de</em>-canonized, this pattern here seems to explain how canonization often <em>starts</em>: not with big prefabricated plans, but with material practice. Examples from the book:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>The privatization of farming land, considered a key enabler for the agricultural revolution in England had started before it had been formalized by law.</li>\n<li>Hoarding and reselling grain was officially illegal up until about 1800, but the abundance of grain provided by agricultural improvements made traders increasingly ignore this outdated law written by premodern scarcity.</li>\n<li>In the shadow of extended civil unrests in England, London became a hotspot of commerce by trespassing restrictions initially designed to keep commerce in check.</li>\n<li>Usury (lending money with high interest rates) was long banned by church and court, but european merchants increasingly worked around it</li>\n<li>English entrepreneurs in a similar fashion intuitively worked around outdated mercantilist practices enforced by the physiocrats.</li>\n<li>The famous British Stock Exchange was established to capture the informal trading practice that had emerged in coffehouses and on the streets</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>3) Canonized ideas often outlive material conditions</strong><br>\nAppleyby states several examples where an established set of ideas lived on in the theory space, while material practice already had moved on for long.<br>\nExamples from the book:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The Law of Malthus (ch. 3):</strong> In 1798 Thomas Malthus argued that population always grows faster than food supply, so every period of plenty ends in famine. But just as he published, English farms were producing steadily larger harvests and families were getting smaller, which broke his law in the very region he described. The idea of &quot;malthusian&quot; scarcity lived on though.</li>\n<li><strong>Smith’s invisible hand (ch. 5):</strong> Adam Smith argued that competition among self-interested actors turns private profit into public benefit, as if guided by an “invisible hand.” Appleby points out that after Smiths lifetime, this idea got overtaken by the realities on the ground: as soon as only a few large firms held most of the capital, newcomers could no longer enter and the real free market was much less free than the supporters of the invisible hand assumed.</li>\n<li><strong>The Mississippi Bubble (ch. 4):</strong> The “Mississippi Company” that was meant to develop French Louisiana based on public shares but ended in a spectacular crash around 1720, which gave us the term “bubble.” The shock was so deep that France maintained a very conservative stance on monetary matters and stayed away from paper money for the next 70 years, while the initial shock and its aftermath had long been compensated.</li>\n<li><strong>The iron law of wages (ch. 7):</strong> An early-19th-century doctrine held that employers should always push wages down to the bare minimum a family needed to survive. By the end of the century, mass production began turning out more goods than people could buy, so the old &quot;iron law&quot; became a major bottleneck for economic development, as it hindered the mass consumption required to justify mass production.</li>\n<li><strong>Stagflation (ch. 11):</strong> Keynes had taught that governments should spend when private demand collapses, and postwar Western governments followed that advice, but they rarely cut spending again when it was no longer needed. After the 1973 oil shock, inflation and unemployment rose together, a &quot;Stagflation&quot; the original Keynes theory did not cover. In Appleby’s words, “the facts no longer supported the original Keynesian proposition,” which “gave an opening” to Milton Friedman’s call to shrink government and leave decisions to markets.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>These three patterns seem to shape a kind of causality chain, somewhat like this:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>first the right material conditions have to be in place: good soil, natural forces, a young and well educated workforce</li>\n<li>then it requires an informal shift of mindset to allow using the material potentials in a new material practice: better farming, hydroelectric dams, engineering excellence</li>\n<li>the material practice then allows informal ideas to harden into canon, official laws and concepts emerge: ==tbd - continue based on previous examples==</li>\n<li>while this is happening, the next matter/ideas-space reconfiguration is already taking off, stepwise reforming first  conditions, then mentality and practice, with canonized ideas floating around longest, while there baseline already has shifted</li>\n</ol>\n<p>There are some resonances of S-curve diffusion in this model. Matter space and idea space influence each other, both oscillating between more static and more fluid states. Obviously there is potential for a fun 2x2 here, with idea-space and matter-space  forming x and y axis:</p>\n<p><img src=\"https://blyg.florianlohse.com/media/secfndzc.jpg\" alt=\"\"></p>\n<p><em>Examples from Appleyby's Relentless Revolution, the rest is my vibe theory</em></p>\n<p>Read clockwise from the bottom left:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The Boiling Pot:</strong> Material potential sits unused (1)</li>\n<li><strong>Coffehouse Capitalism:</strong> Material Practice starts under an informal mindset (2)</li>\n<li><strong>Crystal Palace:</strong> A canon hardens around the practice (3)</li>\n<li><strong>Zombie Canon:</strong> The practice moves on and leaves the canon floating (4)</li>\n<li>The floating canon then shapes the next Boiling Pot.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>This is very rough and not stresstested yet. But it seems plausible and I see some observations and insights from past book club readings resonate here. Maybe this can form something bigger later.</p>\n<p>Some provisional follow-up thoughts:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>This could be read as a macro scale model (&quot;This is how a big idea like capitalism is adopted and discarded by big entities like nations&quot;) or as a micro/meso scale model for smaller developments. I think the latter, smaller reading is more appropriate.</li>\n<li>While these four stages form a loop it seems also possible to leapfrog stages. Different <a href=\"https://blyg.florianlohse.com/t/6f8wfp78mcnat9yr6fzv1t18q6/\">kinds-of-capitalism and associated diverging capitalist attitudes</a> can probably be traced as movements through these quadrants. The trailblazer England had the most time to run through all of these stages and hence may have generated a deeper canonization of classic capitalist ideas than fast followers like Germany or Japan.</li>\n<li>My contribution to the 2026 Protocol Symposium centered around the idea that Personal Time Management has become a kind of obsolete practice which is still shaping the discourse around dealing with time - I think this model here could provide an explanation for the causal development that led to this point. It seems worth a try to link these.</li>\n<li>Naturalization of contingent ideas, the thing Appleby works against in her history of capitalism, happens at the Crystal Palace stage. Here lived material practices align with canonized theory and maybe it is this very alignment that enables naturalization of man made things like economic theories.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Lets see what to make of this.</p>\n\n</blockquote>","content_hash":"sha256:97855ac95d7c57e17a6638bc5e0d4250f6f46009acb3c9ff50a401a0c3ac6da1","media":[],"transclusions":[{"id":"1y3t9rdd8kckjgaq9v7d3sxhhy","version":1},{"id":"6f8wfp78mcnat9yr6fzv1t18q6","version":2},{"id":"3ryetf2ypk8xj5sf9ag3bhetsa","version":2}],"changelog":[{"version":1,"at":"2026-10-25T15:09:19Z","note":"Reposted from florianlohse.com/blyg/ — first published 2026-10-17"},{"version":2,"at":"2026-10-25T20:35:47Z","note":"removed an out of context quote"},{"version":3,"at":"2026-10-31T09:01:05Z","note":"Appended thread about flavors of capitalism"},{"version":4,"at":"2026-11-03T21:14:53Z","note":"added Thread on Ideas and Matter"}]}